Nuclear Policy of Russia: Publications

The One Ring and How to Destroy It – How Russia Has Based Its Foreign Policy on Nuclear Weapons

By Polina Sinovets

This autumn, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has reached a critical stage. On the one hand, the victory of Donald Trump has raised many rumours about future US efforts to pressure Russia and Ukraine to reach a peace agreement; on the other, it was marked by the long-awaited Biden administration permission for Ukraine to perform deep target strikes in Russian territory. This decision was reiterated by the French and the British governments, which showed certain consensus about providing Ukraine with at least gaining some more advantage on the battlefield, though the general expert consensus is that such permission will not change decisively the balance in favour of Ukraine. Even with the limitation that such “deep strikes” be permitted only within the Kursk oblast, this decision has probably reinforced Moscow’s long-discussed concerns that its nuclear deterrence is not working.

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Fifty shades of red: where does Russia draw the line?

By Polina Sinovets

From the outset, the war on Ukraine came with a particular feature attached: the threat of nuclear escalation. As President Putin stated in his 24 February speech, “whoever tries to hinder us or threaten our country or our people should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to consequences that you have never faced in your history." Rather than deterring any type of support to Ukraine, this has instead led to a discussion about what exactly would trigger a nuclear escalation: where do Russia’s red lines really lie?

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Russia’s Disinformation Goes Nuclear

By Polina Sinovets, Khrystyna Holynska and John V. Parachini

Prior to the escalated invasion of Ukraine, the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation alleged that Ukraine was planning to regain its nuclear status and that it would be receiving the help of Western countries. This claim was repeated on 9 May 2022, almost three months following the 24 February incursion, during the closely watched Victory Day speech by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. He declared that Russia could not tolerate Ukraine becoming a nuclear state in its “near abroad” and was forced to take steps to prevent it. These false accusations have been repeatedly refuted by Ukraine, the US, and other Western nations; nevertheless, Moscow continues to disseminate them to Russian and international audiences. Essentially, this should be regarded as one of numerous forms of Russian disinformation that are designed to justify its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and maintain domestic and international support for an illegal military operation that has been floundering.

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NATO Defense College Research Paper "War changes everything: Russia after Ukraine"

By Jānis Bērziņš; Mark Galeotti; Tracey German; Marc Ozawa; Polina Sinovets

There, on that stair landing, I got a quick and lasting lesson in the meaning of the word cornered... Once I spotted a huge rat and pursued it down the hall until I drove it into a corner... Suddenly it lashed around and threw itself at me. I was surprised and frightened. Now the rat was chasing me”.1

In one of his earliest and most candid interviews, the newly elected President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin explained one of his life’s lessons growing up in post-war Leningrad. His account of a cornered rat turning the tables on him, the aggressor, resonates in the current context of Russia’s war with Ukraine. Since Moscow launched the invasion on 24 February 2022, Russia has lashed out not only at Ukraine but also the West and the international community. Keir Giles describes this as “Russia’s war on everybody”, a more aggressive posture that began long before February 2022. However, what the following chapters illustrate is just how the Russia-Ukraine war has amplified this pattern of aggression in dangerous and desperate ways.

he war raises important questions, not only about Russia’s intentions toward its neighbours but also about Moscow’s leadership and approach to the international community. This edited volume addresses some of these matters, such as: how long can Russia sustain its war with Ukraine and how might the character of the war develop? Will Putin risk nuclear war to secure his gains on Ukrainian territory? Has Russia’s approach to hybrid warfare changed since February 2022? What will drive Russia’s defence posture in the future? and What sort of international actor will Russia become in the post Ukraine war era?

To read full NDC Research Paper or to download it.

Are nuclear weapons ineffective in deterring non-nuclear weapon states? The paradox of Russia’s war on Ukraine

By Polina Sinovets and Aderito Vicente

Since February 24, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become a laboratory of major theories and regimes. Most of them were inherited from the Cold War period. At the forefront of this day-to-day testing lab, nuclear deterrence is being assessed for its capabilities and limits. This critical juncture is already paving a new role in today’s international security architecture.

This paper will focus on the limitations of nuclear deterrence and the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons’ in deterring non-nuclear weapon states brightly demonstrated during this war.

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How Russia’s nuclear double cross of Ukraine teaches dangerous lessons

By Polina Sinovets, John Parachini and Khrystyna Holynska

After Moscow’s invasion, nuclear aspirants like Iran or nuclear powers like China may have learned dangerous strategies.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West’s support for Kyiv has been tempered by an ace up Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sleeve: the potential use of nuclear weapons. In the following op-ed Polina Sinovets of the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation and RAND’s John Parachini and Khrystyna Holynska warn that other countries are taking notice, which could imperil world stability even further.

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Russian roulette: the Kremlin’s escalation strategy from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea

By Polina Sinovets, Iryna Maksymenko & Maksym Skrypnyk

This article explores escalation as a tool which is being used in Russian military strategy in the twenty-first century. This method of operation has been transformed from a purely defensive deterrence asset which was valid at the beginning of the 2000s into an element of aggressive deterrence, one which bases itself on Russia presenting Crimea’s annexation as a fait accompli. The authors conclude that the strategic value for Moscow of the Black Sea region has grown with the annexation of Crimea, so that it now surpasses the value of the Baltic region. This can be inferred by comparing the Russian military potential which is present in both regions, as well as through related doctrines and corresponding decisions. To a major extent, the Russian stance in the Baltic plays a coercive role in its strategy: it aims to boost deterrence on the Black Sea, where Moscow sees itself as being more vulnerable.

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The growing role of the nuclear factor in interstate politics: The case of Russia’s war against Ukraine

By Polina Sinovets

The paper analyses the nuclear threats made by Russia in the course of its war against Ukraine as part of a complex analysis of Russia’s internal doctrines and international reaction that seeks to shed light on the Kremlin’s reasons for nuclear coercion. The implications of such nuclear threats and possible scenarios for nuclear weapon use by Russia are discussed. The conclusions provide an overview of the possible outcomes of Russia’s nuclear coercion for the future role of nuclear weapons, the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the international world order.

To read full EUNPDC Policy Paper.

Between the Rock and the Hard Place: will the Black Sea Avoid the Escalation Ladder?

By Polina Sinovets

Since 2014 the Black Sea basin has been the showcase of the contested region where the growing expansion of Russia, on one hand, and the boosting forwarded presence of NATO, on the other, has the potential for a clash. This growing atten¬tion on the region is defined by the Russian annexation of Crimea, which was included in Moscow's defence perimeter in the Fundamentals of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy of 2020 and therefore made the Black Sea an area of possible sub-strategic use of nuclear weapons. However, a consistent and firm policy by NATO is capable of preventing the ultimate transformation of the Black Sea into a "Russian lake" by drawing the clear "red lines” for Russia and supporting the most vulnerable partners of the Alliance, Ukraine and Georgia.

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How the “Escalation Strategy” Evolved in Russia’s Security Policy

By Polina Sinovets

The “escalation strategy” has been a constant element in Russia’s international behavior for the last twenty years. Stemming from the well-known “escalation for de-escalation” principle that first appeared in the Russian Military Doctrine of 2000, it made the long journey from being a pure deterrence tool during the years of Russia’s (conventional-weaponry) inferiority to gaining more and more coercive functionality, especially after the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Since then, we can observe through Russian actions its evolution from the military (mostly nuclear) sphere into foreign affairs as a coercive, military-based tool serving the Kremlin’s political goals. The relatively sudden increase in tension between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of this year coincided with provocative moves, such as Ukraine turning off the water supply to Crimea and new U.S. President Joe Biden calling Russian President Vladimir Putin a killer. Precipitously, Moscow deployed an unprecedented concentration of troops at Ukraine’s border. Policymakers and journalists discussed the possibility of a Moscow offensive, perhaps further changing the borders of Europe. In the end, Moscow’s concerns were addressed, perhaps via the “professional” conclusion of the Biden-Putin summit in June, and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration remained unchanged.

To read full PONAR Policy Memo.