Nuclear Policy of USA: Publications

North Korea's Nuclear Program: From Nonproliferation Issue to Deterrence

By Valeriia Gergiieva

The article provides an understanding of North Korea’s nuclear program and its path to it. There is a range of reasons that explain why after the breakdown of the USSR, North Korea chose such a strategy and why the South didn’t. The U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula has a significant influence on these countries. Thereby the Bush Administration’s policy is viewed as the last chance to speak about North Korea as a challenge for the Nonproliferation regime. Nowadays, after six nuclear tests and numerous ballistic missiles tests (including long-range ballistic missiles since 2017), North Korea is more about Deterrence, as it is already a nuclear state. Crises of 2017 and 2020 show the necessity to build a new strategy for the U.S. and the whole international community. The further dialogue with North Korea is unpredictable and depends on the U.S. elections, consequences of Covid-19, and Kim’s readiness to cooperate.

To read full PONAR Eurasia Commentary.

INF: The Path Forward

By Miles Pomper and Valeriia Lozova

President Trump's October 2018 announcement that he intended to withdraw the United States from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia given Moscow's perceived noncompliance with the pact has interjected further tension into an already deeply strained relationship between Moscow and Washington. The move to withdraw has also threatened what many experts saw as a pillar of strategic stability, particularly in Europe. At the same time, the decision risks further escalating growing military confrontation between the United States and China. Given the rising tensions, some US allies in Europe and Asia have lobbied the Trump administration to preserve the treaty, although such a resolution appears unlikely at this time. While the administration's decision to leave the treaty was questionable, it has made clear the need to develop an arms control regime in Europe and Asia better suited to today's strategic and technological realities.

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A Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Resolve the INF Treaty Crisis

By Polina Sinovets and Miles Pomper

Few in Washington express much doubt that Russia recently violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, testing and deploying ground-launched cruise missiles within the treaty’s prohibited range.

Yet the lack of clear public evidence of Russian violations amid persistent Russian denials has left the United States in a position where the strongest American retaliatory responses could provide Russia with an excuse to abandon the treaty.

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The CTBT: Possible Subsequent Domino Effect of the U.S. Ratification in the Context of the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

By Valeriia Lozova

President Trump's October 2018 announcement that he intended to withdraw the United States from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia given Moscow's perceived noncompliance with the pact has interjected further tension into an already deeply strained relationship between Moscow and Washington. The move to withdraw has also threatened what many experts saw as a pillar of strategic stability, particularly in Europe. At the same time, the decision risks further escalating growing military confrontation between the United States and China. Given the rising tensions, some US allies in Europe and Asia have lobbied the Trump administration to preserve the treaty, although such a resolution appears unlikely at this time. While the administration's decision to leave the treaty was questionable, it has made clear the need to develop an arms control regime in Europe and Asia better suited to today's strategic and technological realities.

To read full text