OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Weekly Report #3

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Published: Monday, 03 October 2022 18:08

Odessa Center for Nonproliferation introduces "OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Weekly Report #3" by Aderito Vicente.

Arms control

The New START Treaty remains the only nuclear arms control (and disarmament) agreement in place between Moscow and Washington as relations hit rock-bottom over the conflict in Ukraine. Following its extension in February 2021, however, it will expire in 2026. Barring any renewed détente between US and Russia, it could also be at risk, particularly if the War on Ukraine worsens or persists.

In the context of Moscow's decision of prohibiting on-site inspections[1] of its nuclear weapons-related facilities subject to the START (allegedly due to Washington’s military support to Ukraine) and in addition to the findings of our latest reports, the U.S. continues to condition talks on New START Inspections.


Photo by Alexander Zemlianichenko

On 29 September, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Russia was studying the possibility of a face-to-face meeting between Russian and U.S. negotiators on a landmark nuclear arms control treaty. So far, we have not observed a formal US reply to the Russian proposal.

Although Russia ultimately blocked consensus on the final draft document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, Presidents Biden and Putin have both repeatedly expressed verbal support for nuclear arms control talks to restart. Our assessment continues to be that there has not been any progress regarding START negotiations since the beginning of September.

Non-proliferation

Iran has been rolling back its adherence to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, increasing its stock of enriched uranium and turning off monitoring cameras operated by IAEA. Despite the deterioration of the JCPOA, Iran remains until the present day a non-nuclear weapon state.

Negotiations to bring Iran and the US back into the nuclear deal curbing Tehran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions continued to be in "stalemate". Compared to our last week's report, the situation towards reviving the JCPOA has dramatically worsened. Due to domestic politics and regional allies' pressure, Washington tightened its sanctions against several foreign companies involved in the oil trade with Tehran, Iran's most important (trade) commodity.

Critics of the US current administration, namely the United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), an advocacy group that opposes the revival of the JCPOA, argued that since President Biden's election, China has bought around $38 billion of crude oil from Iran in violation of US third-party sanctions. In reply to UANI's report, the US State Department spokesperson Ned Price on September 28 stated that "what we can say with some confidence is that some of the open-source statistics have been inflated, and that is the case when it comes to certain reports of Iranian oil exports to the PRC [People's Republic of China]".

However, the shipment of at least 750,000 barrels of crude per day to China has been reported by industry sources and news agencies since early 2021, which corresponds close to $30 billion in oil sales. Although this is far below the heyday of Iran's $100 billion annual oil export earnings around 2010, it was enough to convince Tehran that it can weather the economic pressure while negotiating with the US. Now, the Biden administration is left with no discernible Iran policy except tightening enforcement of sanctions, the same "maximum pressure" strategy Trump was using when he lost the 2020 election.

In addition, a popular revolt against the clerical regime in Tehran, generated by the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, who received fatal blows to her head while being arrested for "inappropriate hijab", has exposed the degree to which the rulers are willing to use violence against their own citizens. This event forced the US and Europe to consider the imposition of new human rights sanctions. Both her killing and the ensuing protests have triggered an important level of international support for the people in Iran, which can be a double nail in the coffin of the JCPOA talks.

Thus, a renewed deal would have released tens of billions of dollars for Iran and in the current setting of human rights violations by Tehran, signing a nuclear agreement that would lift sanctions and enrich the government, seems improbable. The Biden administration has seemingly reached the conclusion that Iran does not want a nuclear deal, which would mean that the way it tried to revive the JCPOA simply allowed Iran to sell more oil and greatly advance its nuclear program. It calculated that maybe it can reach the nuclear weapons threshold and have enough income to survive.


Photo by SeongJoon Cho

Meanwhile, after North Korea passed a law last week declaring itself to be a nuclear weapons state, North Korea fired unspecified ballistic missiles toward the east coast of South Korea on 29 September, Joint Chiefs of Staff said. This marked Pyongyang's fourth launch in a week as it ratchets up the tension in the Korean peninsula. The launch comes after the United States and South Korea held the Ulchi Freedom Shield, the biggest joint military drill in about five years, and follows U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris' visit to South Korea last week. North Korea fired missiles before and after Harris' visit to South Korea, extending a record pace in weapons testing this year as it increases the threat of a credible nuclear power that can strike the United States and its allies. Our assessment is that, since North Korea started its declaratory policy and consequent missile ballistic tests, accident might happen. Therefore, the nuclear threat or conflict over the Korean Peninsula and the Sea of Japan has slightly increased.

Deterrence

Following Moscow's February invasion of Ukraine, the US and its allies have responded with military aid to Ukraine, sanctions on the Russian economy, and reinforcements to NATO's eastern flank. Until now, Russia's nuclear deterrence has prevented the US and its allies from direct military intervention against Russia. However, nuclear threats are core to Russia's military strategy, and there is a risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine[2] to achieve its goals in the war.


Photo by Alexander Nemenov

On 30 September, Putin's speech at the Grand Kremlin Palace's St George Hall, in which he formally proclaimed the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, was many things but showed to the world an appalling and quasi-veiled plan i.e. that the United States "created a precedent" for the use of nuclear weapons with its bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

The implication seems obvious. If the West continues to send weapons to Ukraine and refuses to put pressure on Kyiv to agree to a solution that would satisfy Russia, President Putin may resort to the nuclear option. Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in his New York Times piece, argued that "there is one clear explanation as to why the use of a nuclear weapon, or even talking about it, is a great temptation for Mr. Putin and for those who share his views about Russia's standing in the world".

Putin's rationale, first, comes from is understanding of equality. "To be equal to the United States, Russia must show that it can do anything the Americans can, regardless of when the Americans did it or what the context was," added Baunov. Second, together with this symmetrical concept of equality, emanates an almost superstitious idea of global justice. This notion, "especially since the prospect of Russia winning a conventional war is uncertain, if not improbable," claimed Baunov. Kremlin doesn't recognize any exit strategy that cannot be passed off as some sort of victory. This conflict is increasingly presented as existential for Russia. Putin and many Russian commentators want to convince the outside world that they are serious. The question is: how serious Putin wants the West and Ukraine to believe in him?

On 30 September, Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO and Steven C. Házy, Lecturer at Stanford University, tweeted that the "nuclear attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were so horrific that they created not a precedent but a 77-year taboo". As result, the "Kremlin should not be eager to break it," she added.

Moreover, a group of nuclear experts from the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), warned that Russia's threat to use tactical nuclear weapons to seize battlefield advantage might undermine other security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states around the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

Senior U.S. and NATO officials have warned Russia may resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons following their recent battlefield setbacks in Ukraine. In an interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said he expects President Vladimir Putin to continue to suggest he might use nuclear weapons in Russia's war with Ukraine, and that it is possible he could actually do so. "There are no checks on Mr. Putin," Austin added in a CNN interview that aired on 2 October. He continued warning about Putin, stating that "just as he made the irresponsible decision to invade Ukraine, you know, he could make another decision". However, Defence Secretary Austin believes that he does not "see anything right now" that would lead him to "believe he [Putin] has made such a decision".p>

In this context, Nicholas Miller, nuclear expert and Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth University, argued that "if you're trying to deter Russian nuclear use, you can make highly credible threats to impose limited costs (e.g., more sanctions) or less credible threats to impose major costs (e.g., nuclear or major conventional retaliation)". He added that "it's a core dilemma of deterrence".p>

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced he was accelerating his country's bid to join NATO, hours after Russia declared it would annex four new regions of Ukrainian territory in a land grab widely denounced by the international community as illegitimate and illegal.  NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_207788.htm">said in a press conference on 30 September that Ukraine has a right to apply for NATO membership. He added that "we have stated again and again that NATO's door remains open". Furthermore, Stoltenberg on Ukraine's possible membership was up to NATO's 30 member states, but he reiterated that in the meantime, the alliance would continue to support Ukraine because "inaction is a greater risk" to European security. In addition, the heads of nine European NATO members on 2 October issued a joint statement backing a path to membership for Ukraine in the U.S.-led security alliance, and calling on all 30 NATO nations to ramp up military aid for Kyiv.

All things considered, I argue that given Putin's annexation of the four occupied Ukrainian regions, Kyiv's government counter-attacked with the only proposal (adherence to NATO) that grants both security guarantees to Ukraine's territorial integrity and nuclear extended deterrence to avert Russia's aggression. However, I contend that the treaty of Washington poses some challenges to the entry of Ukraine to NATO.

Despite President Putin’s implied nuclear threats to use nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory, our assessment is that a Russian attack with small nuclear weapons in Ukraine remains unlikely but increasingly possible. The main difference in relation to our last week's assessment is that for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, top government leaders in Moscow are making explicit nuclear threats. While officials in Washington are gaming out scenarios should Putin decide to use a tactical nuclear weapon to make up for the failings of Russian troops in Ukraine.

This nuclear threat increased due these deteriorating events in the Russia's war on Ukraine. The West has responded, though with more ambiguity. Recently, however, the US has said that any nuclear attack by Russia on Ukraine would be met with a massive conventional response. It is still unknow if the US is willing to provide any further actions besides its, and apparently NATO, conventional deterrence.

According to our interpretation of the Russian military strategy, which includes both its Military Doctrine and Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, the the red line(s) for Russia to use nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian territory would remain to be seen. However, in light of the recent events, we believe with a degree of confidence that perhaps a potential red line scenarios would include not just Kyiv's reconquest Crimea (or invade Russia's mainland territory) but the four occupied Ukrainian territories - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. It still remains to be clear which borders of these regions are recognised by Russia as part of their territory.

Disarmament

Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only because the US and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads. The trend is that the military stockpiles (useable nuclear weapons) are increasing again.

At the start of 2022, there are around 12,705 nuclear bombs ready to be deployed. Despite some countries growing their arsenals, this marked, according to SIPRI, decrease from an estimated 13 080 at the beginning of 2021.

After the failure of the UN conference in producing the final document, nuclear disarmament advocates look to new strategies but the divide between TPNW supporters and opponents continues.


Photo by Xinhua

On 26 September, while commemorating the International Day for the Total Elimination of nuclear weapons, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres tweeted that "nuclear disarmament is not a utopian dream". He urged "all countries to ease tensions, reduce risk and forge a new consensus around defusing the nuclear threat for good," while promoting the idea that "eliminating these devices of death is possible, and necessary."

Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met for a brief organizational meeting on 29 of September. The First Committee approved a work programme after electing Peter Mohan Maithri Pieris (Sri Lanka) as its Chair for the General Assembly's seventy-seventh session, following the withdrawal of Magzhan Ilyassov (Kazakhstan) from that position. The Chair outlined the programme of work (documents A/C.1/77/CRP.1 and A/C.1/77/CRP.2), from 3 October to 4 November. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, thematic discussions will be discussed from 14 to 27 October.

Notwithstanding, the nuclear disarmament process continues to be dangerously frozen, mutatis mutandis, at the multilateral level. There are no expectations that will change in near future.


[1] In fact, the inspections have been paused since March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic, and they have not resumed ever since.

[2] Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum Agreement, Ukraine (unlike other European non-nuclear weapon states) is not covered by security guarantees such as US extended nuclear deterrence.