OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Weekly Report #2
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- Published: Monday, 26 September 2022 18:07
Odessa Center for Nonproliferation introduces "OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Weekly Report #2" by Aderito Vicente.
Arms control
Photo by Ryo Nakamura/Nikkei Asia
The New START Treaty remains the only nuclear arms control (and disarmament) agreement between the US and Russia in effect. Following its extension; in February 2021, however, it will expire in 2026. Barring any renewed détente between Washington and Moscow, it could also be at risk, particularly if the War on Ukraine worsens or persists.
In the context of Moscow's decision of prohibiting on-site inspections[1] of its nuclear weapons-related facilities subject to the START due to Washington's involvement in the Ukraine war and in addition to the findings of our last Report of 19 September 2022, US Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, in an interview Nikkei Asia on 24 September, revealed that resuming dialogue with Russia toward a new nuclear arms treaty would be a "challenge" amid Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. She also added that little progress has been made on proposed nuclear talks with China.
Moreover, in the wake of Russian President Putin's speech on 21 September, US nuclear experts from the Ploughshares Fund, Tom Z. Collina and Angela Kellett, recently defended in a Defense One piece, that Russia's war on Ukraine is no reason to put arms control negotiations on hold. They warned that without an agreement between the two parties, "there would be no limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles for the first time in 50 years". Collina and Kellet argued that in order to avoid this perilous situation, the "US and Russia need to restart talks to replace New START", which should include lower limits on the size of their arsenals, cover new delivery systems and technologies, and address tactical nuclear weapons, among other things.
Both experts also recognized that "politics are tricky" and agree that US president Biden faces a major challenge: he "is understandably reluctant to normalize Putin too soon by sitting down with him". As a result, they reasoned that bilateral talks cannot resume "until there is at least a ceasefire in Ukraine". Nonetheless, the two sides could eventually meet informally or through intermediaries to exchange ideas. Additionally, inspections under the existing treaty must be resumed as soon as possible, added Collina and Kellet.
Although Russia ultimately blocked consensus on the final draft document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, Presidents Biden and Putin have both repeatedly expressed verbal support for nuclear arms control talks to restart. Our assessment continues to be that there has not been any progress regarding START since the beginning of September.
Non-proliferation
Iran has been rolling back its adherence to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, increasing its stock of enriched uranium and turning off monitoring cameras operated by IAEA. Despite the deterioration of the JCPOA, Iran remains until the present day a non-nuclear weapon state.
Negotiations to bring Iran and the US back into the nuclear deal curbing Tehran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions continued to be in "stalemate". On 26 September, despite last week's EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell's pessimism, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan tells CBS News' Face the Nation that the negotiations with Iran to renew the nuclear deal will not stop the US "in any way from pushing back and speaking out on Iran's brutal repression of its citizens and its women," when asked about the death of Iranian woman Mahsa Amini.
Meanwhile, on 25 September, after North Korea passed a law last week declaring itself to be a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang fired a suspected ballistic missile off its east coast, its first known test since June, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement. The event came after a US aircraft carrier arrived in South Korea to participate in joint drills, and ahead of a planned visit by Vice President Kamala Harris. In response, Seoul declared that the launch was an unjustifiable "act of grave provocation" and South Korea's National Security Council held an emergency meeting to discuss response measures and condemned the launch as an apparent violation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The UNSC prohibits North Korea from ballistic and nuclear weapons tests.
Photo by Sky News
In addition, since Russia blocked the 10th NPT Review Conference from reaching a consensus on a substantive outcome document, no major new diplomatic progress on non-proliferation at the multilateral level has been tackled or achieved by the states this week.
Deterrence
Following Moscow's February invasion of Ukraine, the US and its allies have responded with military aid to Ukraine, sanctions on the Russian economy, and reinforcements to NATO's eastern flank. Until now, Russia's nuclear deterrence has prevented the US and its allies from direct military intervention against Russia. However, nuclear threats are core to Russia's military strategy, and there is a risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine[2] to achieve its goals in the war.
On 21 September, Putin sent shockwaves to the world with his speech by stating that "in the event of a threat to the territorial integrity" of Russia and promised to defend it with the “use of all weapon systems available to us", adding that he is not a bluffing. The Russian President without ever using the word nuclear, implied the threat of using these weapons.
One day after, this veiled reference to the country's nuclear arsenal was reckless reaffirmed by Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian President and deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council. In a post on Telegram, Medvedev wrote that territory in eastern Ukraine would be "accepted into Russia" after the completion of staged referendums and vowed to strengthen the security of those areas and protect them with the inclusion of "nuclear weapons" deterrence. It is still unclear at this point if Dmitry Medvedev's warning was legit, but if true that would mean that these occupied territories formally admitted to the Russian Federation, where Ukrainian counteroffensives have gathered pace in recent weeks, will under Moscow's nuclear doctrine be entitled to protection from Russian nuclear weapons.
Some months ago, nuclear scholars (such as Francesca Giovannini, Caitlin Talmadge, Joe Cirincione among others) posed the possibility that Russia might use smaller tactical nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as "battlefield nukes" to end a conventional war favorably on its terms, a strategy sometimes described as "escalate to de-escalate". Our director Polina Sinovets does not disregard that possibility but does not take it lightly. In a recent PONAR Policy Memo, she concedes, however, that "battlefield desperation or an unexpected military mishap could trigger a Russian nuclear release".
On 22 September, Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, told the UK's ITV News that it is possible Russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine "to stop our offensive activity and to destroy our state". On 25 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on CBS's Face the Nation reaffirmed equally this idea arguing that Putin nuclear threat "could be a reality".
Moreover, Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, argues that whereas previous Kremlin statements appeared to be aimed at warning the US and its allies against going too far in helping Ukraine, Putin's most recent comments suggested Russia is considering using a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine to freeze gains and force Kyiv and its backers into submission. However, James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggested in a tweet that "nuclear use is not imminent" but "is not the same as dismissing the possibility". A particularly important distinction. Acton goes far as saying that has "little sympathy with the argument that Putin won't do it because it won't serve Russian interests", claiming ironically "that invading Ukraine was clearly not in Russian interests, but...."
In response, according to the Washington Post, the US sent private warnings to Russia against using potentially a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. The Biden administration has been sending messages to Moscow about the grave consequences that would follow the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. This warning was reaffirmed by Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, on 25 September at NBC's Meet the Press. He spoke that the President Biden had "communicated directly, privately to the Russians at very high levels" how it would respond if Vladimir Putin carried out the nuclear strike. NSA Sullivan added that "if Russia crosses this line, there will be catastrophic consequences for Russia. The United States will respond decisively". However, the US official did not describe the nature of the planned response but said the Biden administration had privately "spelled out in greater detail exactly what that would mean".
Despite President Putin's implied nuclear threats to use nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory, our assessment is that a Russian attack with small nuclear weapons in Ukraine remains unlikely but not impossible. Thus, we see no reason to increase its likelihood at this moment. The main difference in relation to our last week's assessment is that there is no actual increased nuclear threat yet, just an increase of nuclear escalatory rhetoric. It is still unclear at the moment if US private warnings will deter Russia from pursuing a path towards the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
According to our interpretation of the Russian military strategy, which includes both its Military Doctrine and Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, the the red line(s) for Russia to use nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian territory would remain to be seen. But we believe with a degree of confidence that perhaps a potential red line scenario would be Kyiv's reconquest Crimea (or invade Russia's mainland territory) that would constitute a red line. However, due to Russia's vile and illegal interpretation of the concepts of territorial integrity and existence of the state, our threat assessment might change after the so-called referendums in the in the Russian-held parts of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces are completed.
Disarmament
Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only because the US and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads. The trend is that the military stockpiles (useable nuclear weapons) are increasing again.
Photo by UN Photo/Milton Grant
After the failure of the UN conference in producing the final document, nuclear disarmament advocates look to new strategies but the divide between TPNW supporters and opponents continues.
On 26 September, the UN and the disarmament community celebrates the International Day for the Total Elimination of nuclear weapons. At the moment, there are around 12,705 nuclear bombs ready to be deployed. Russia's war of Ukraine has raised the looming threat of a nuclear war.
As a result, the nuclear disarmament process continues to be dangerously frozen, mutatis mutandis, at the multilateral level.
[1] In fact, the inspections have been paused since March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic, and they have not resumed ever since.
[2] Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum Agreement, Ukraine (unlike other European non-nuclear weapon states) is not covered by security guarantees such as US extended nuclear deterrence.