OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Report #4

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Published: Saturday, 12 November 2022 00:29

Odessa Center for Nonproliferation introduces "OdCNP Nuclear Weapons Report #4" by Aderito Vicente and Valeriia Gergiieva.

Arms control

The New START Treaty remains the only nuclear arms control (and disarmament) agreement in place between Moscow and Washington as relations hit rock-bottom over the conflict in Ukraine. Following its extension in February 2021, however, it will expire in 2026. Barring any renewed détente between US and Russia, it could also be at risk, particularly if the War on Ukraine worsens or persists.

In the context of Moscow's decision of prohibiting on-site inspections[1] of its nuclear weapons-related facilities subject to the START due to Washington's involvement in the Ukraine war, the Biden administration finally released an unclassified version of its long-delayed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on 27 October 2022. Besides placing renewed emphasis on arms control, the new NPR document mentions that the US and Russia's "priorities are not identical, underscoring the importance of dialogue, when conditions permit, to address each side's differing goals and perceptions of military systems that affect strategic stability".


Photo by the White House

Although Russia ultimately blocked consensus on the final draft document of the 10th NPT Review Conference, Presidents Biden and Putin have both repeatedly expressed verbal support for nuclear arms control talks to restart. On November 8, however, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the US and Russia have agreed to hold talks on START between the two countries soon. It remains to be seen if in fact, these talks will take place and if they will unblock the current stalemate regarding START's implementation and renewal.

Non-proliferation

Iran has been rolling back its adherence to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, increasing its stock of enriched uranium and turning off monitoring cameras operated by IAEA. Despite the deterioration of the JCPOA, Iran remains until the present day a non-nuclear weapon state.

Negotiations to bring Iran and the US back into the nuclear deal curbing Tehran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions continued to be in "stalemate". JCPOA negotiations to restore the deal are currently paused. In an October 10 report, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that Iran informed the agency of its plans to install three additional cascades of IR-2 centrifuges used to enrich uranium. The Biden administration is also increasing pressure on Iran while negotiations remain stalled, including new sanctions targeting Iran's petrochemical sector announced in October.


Photo by EPA, BBC News

On 20 October, the EU adopted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in the transfer and production of Iranian drones used by the Russian army in Ukraine, including attacks on civilians. Under the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, Iran is prohibited from exporting missile systems or unmanned aerial vehicles, such as drones, capable of delivering a weapon of mass destruction. This resolution was adopted to support the JCPOA Under the resolution, Iran is banned from exporting ballistic missiles until 2023. Nevertheless, Iran is moving further with its cooperation with Russia, and on October 18, Tehran agreed to provide Moscow with surface-to-surface missiles and many additional cheap drones. This demonstrates Iranian transformed motivation, which is not focused on negotiations with the West but on movement to the future proliferation path.

On November 2, during a meeting with students from across the country, Ayatollah Khamenei made remarks that a new world order is emerging worldwide, and the youths need to recognize Iran's role and position in the imminent world order. Also, he added that unlike in the past, when the Americans considered themselves the only dominant power in the world, the United States does not have an important position in the new order and is isolated, which strengthened confidence in JCPOA negotiations failure. A state Department spokesperson Robert Malley asserted that "we believe diplomacy is the best way to not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, but President Biden has also been clear that we have got removed any option from the table, and that the military option remains as the last resort".

Despite the regime's optimism, Iran's internal situation is not stable because of the nationwide protests across the country since September 16, when a young woman, Mahsa Amini, died in the hospital after being beaten by police for what they called her "inappropriate hijab." There is no break in protests in Iran at the moment as demonstrations continue in various cities and activists call for more rallies and civil disobedience in the coming days. Today, many Iranians understand the importance of human rights, which complicates the regime's willingness to use barbaric violence to hold on to power. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime is too strong and has gotten used to holding on to its power, so it is far away from collapse.

Meanwhile, on 25 September, after North Korea passed a law last week declaring itself to be a nuclear weapons state, The main message of Kim Jong Un's regime is that North Korea will never give up its nuclear arsenal whenever it exists in the world.


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a meeting in September 2022 in the country's capital Pyongyang.
(Photo by Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

One more matter of concern is that North Korea has had a record number of missile launches this year - more than 20, including ICBMs, demonstrating North Korea's various options for delivering nuclear weapons. On October 4, North Korea tested an ICBM, which flew approximately 2,800 miles over Japan for 22 minutes, partially in response to recent military exercises involving South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This was the first North Korean missile to fly over Japan since 2017 and was the longest-known North Korean missile flight yet.

On October 27, Bonnie Jenkins, State Department Under Secretary for arms control, was asked at a Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference at which point North Korea should be treated as an arms-control problem. "If they would have a conversation with us ... arms control can always be an option if you have two willing countries willing to sit down at the table and talk," she replied. Nevertheless, Washington argued that the North Korean nuclear program has been illegal and subject to United Nations sanctions for many years, and at the moment, there is no hope that Kim Jong Un is ready to negotiate its nuclear and missile programs.


The TV screen at a railway station in Seoul, South Korea, shows an image of a DPRK missile launch on October 10, 2022
(Photo by Ahn Young-joon/AP)

On November 2, South Korea announced that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had fired 23 missiles to the east and west of the Korean Peninsula, which landed close to South Korean territorial waters for the first time since the division of Korea. Moreover, the US and international observers have been warning for months that North Korea appears to be preparing for an underground nuclear test, as the satellite imagery shows activity at the nuclear test site.

So, the current security environment in the northeast Asian region is, undoubtedly, raising even higher tensions between North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. The danger of a nuclear arms race in Asia is more severe than ever, as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which nuclear power attacked a non-nuclear power, proved the political power of nuclear weapons and questioned the US ability to defend in case of North Korea's or China's power projection intentions. The risk of China invading Taiwan has been on the agenda since February, and there are negative impacts of the war on South Korea.

Deterrence

Following Moscow's February invasion of Ukraine, the US and its allies have responded with military aid to Ukraine, sanctions on the Russian economy, and reinforcements to NATO's eastern flank. Until now, Russia's nuclear deterrence has prevented the US and its allies from direct military intervention against Russia.

The paradox of this conflict, according to Polina Sinovets, Head of Odesa Center for Nonproliferation, is that unlike the nuclear West, which is somewhat deterred by Russian strategic nuclear weapons to interfere in the conflict, Ukraine seems to be not deterred by the Russian nuclear rhetoric to use tactical nuclear weapons. However, nuclear threats are core to Russia's military strategy, and there is still a risk that Russian President Vladimir Putin might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine[2] to achieve its goals in the war.

According to our interpretation of the Russian military strategy, which includes both its Military Doctrine and Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, the red line(s) for Russia to use nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory would remain to be seen.

Despite Putin's previous implied nuclear threats, he recently declared, on October 27, that he will not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It is still unclear at the moment if US private warnings combined with the disclosure of the new NPR may have an impact on Russia's decision to discourage a potential decision to use low-yield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Considering the effectiveness of Russia's asymmetric strategy of deliberating targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure over the past weeks, our threat assessment is that at this point the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely.

Moreover, despite the challenges presented by Russia (in Ukraine and NATO) and China (namely in Taiwan), the new NPR seeks to respond with adjustments in the existing force posture and increase integration of conventional and nuclear planning.

According to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda from the Federation of American Scientists, the NPR reiterates the language from the 2010 NPR that the "fundamental role" of U.S. nuclear weapons "is to deter nuclear attacks" and only in "extreme circumstances." The strategy seeks to "maintain a very high bar for nuclear employment" and if the employment of nuclear weapons is necessary, "seek to end the conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its Allies and partners."

Thus, NPR reaffirms long-standing US policy about the role of nuclear weapons but with slightly modified language. The role is: 1) Deter strategic attacks, 2) Assure allies and partners, and 3) Achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.

Disarmament

Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only because the US and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads. The trend is that the military stockpiles (useable nuclear weapons) are increasing again.

After the failure of this year's NPT Review Conference in producing the final document, nuclear disarmament advocates look to new strategies but the divide between Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) supporters and opponents continues.

While the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee continues with its meetings and discussions on nuclear disarmament and international security issues in New York, Australia for the first time abstained from voting on a resolution that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it "at the earliest possible date". This move formally brought an end to five years of Australian opposition to the treaty. (From 2018 to 2021, Australia voted against the resolution.)


The Australian foreign affairs minister, Penny Wong, said through a spokesperson that Australia had "a long and proud commitment to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime" and that the government supported the new treaty's "ambition of a world without nuclear weapons". In response, the US has warned Australia against joining the TPNWs, saying the agreement could hamper defence arrangements between the US and its allies.

Notwithstanding, the nuclear disarmament process continues to be dangerously frozen, mutatis mutandis, at the multilateral level. There are no expectations that will change in near future.


[1] In fact, the inspections have been paused since March 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic, and they have not resumed ever since.

[2] Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum Agreement, Ukraine (unlike other European non-nuclear weapon states) is not covered by security guarantees such as US extended nuclear deterrence.