Western Dependence on Russian nuclear sector. How not to throw the nuclear baby out with the bath water
By Wojciech Jakóbik, energy sector analyst, Jagiellonian Institute
The West needs to decrease reliance on Russians in nuclear fuel supply chain. It will take years so the room for strict nuclear sanctions against Russian nuclear sector is limited. However there is a clear interest in binding goals of decreasing reliance on Russians. It could also be a way to support developing domestic capacity in this manner.
Persisting reliance on Russia
European Union is securing the supply of nuclear materials through Euratom Supply Agency. It is a EURATOM treaty organization consisting of EU countries responsible i.e. for nuclear fuel supplies that are necessary for nuclear energy production. According to ESA annual report for 2022, long term contracts under its auspicies were responsible for 98 percent of uranium supply. Kazakhstan, Niger, Russia and Canada supplied more than 90 percent of natural uranium delivered to EURATOM countries. Deliveries from Russia decreased by 16 percent compensated with increase in imports from other post-Soviet countries, mainly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Conversion services were provided by French Orano (37 percent), Russian Rosatom (22 percent), Canadian Cameco (21 percent) and ConverDyn from U.S. (16 percent). There was a steep decrease in reliance on Russian Rosatom (-25 percent) and Cameco (-20 percent) correlated with an increase from Orano (10 percent) and ConverDyn (16,30 percent). When it comes to enrichment, 62 percent of services were originated inside EU and 30 percent were coming from Russia.
Up to decade of work ahead
ESA is underlining “a significant vulnerability to the security of supply” in the context of WWER post-Soviet reactors in European Union that require Russian fuel fabrications services in spite of efforts to diversify away with new suppliers like American Westinghouse in Ukraine[1]. [2]. That means the level of European dependence on Russians in nuclear fuel cycle is significant, but it is decreasing. ESA states that “new geopolitical situation” which is related to Russian invasion in Ukraine brings new risk to security of supply, as there is not enough capacity to diversify away fully from Russia. Building the additional conversion and enrichment capacity could take “several years” and that is why ESA is arguing for clear policy supporting such development. U.S., France and Great Britain have already announced plans to become more independent in nuclear sector by increasing their domestic capacity. Again, there are no clear timeframes of quitting that reliance. European plan called REPowerEU from May 2022 is including an appeal for diversification in nuclear fuel supply chain in Europe. - This requires working within the EU and with international partners to secure alternative sources of uranium and boosting the conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication capacities available in Europe or in EU’s global partners. In addition to diversifying external suppliers, continuing domestic natural gas production for Member States where this is possible can contribute to strengthen security of supply – is stated inside REPowerEU communique[3]. It is a case of security of supply and effective support for Ukraine. Kyiv is appealing to EU for Rosatom sanctions since January 2023[4]. However, the REPowerEU plan is not including any exact solution or timeframe when it comes to decreasing nuclear fuel supply chain reliance on Russia. The reason might be the time needed to decrease dependence on Russians, especially in countries like Hungary which is pursuing further nuclear cooperation with Rosatom around Paks Nuclear Power Plant project. According to ESA boss Agnieszka Kaźmierczak from Poland WWER reactors in Europe would need about three years to change the fuel supply chain. When it comes to enrichment and conversion in Europe it is 3-10 years needed[5]. The only articulated deadline for quitting reliance on Russia in European nuclear fuel cycle then is 2026-2033.
That is why Kyiv School For Economics argues for personal sanctions in Russian nuclear sector, like Rosatom[6]. This postulate is also connected to controversies around occupation in Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant lasting since March 2022 when Russian troops entered the facility and forcefully introduced Rosatom authority. Since then there were multiple incidents hurting the nuclear safety, underlined by IAEA[7].
Recommendations
- Because of security of supply concerns it is needed to stay with personal sanctions against individuals from Russia connected to Zaporizhia NPP occupation. Personal sanctions will not lead to risk in security of supply. The example are personal sanctions for Russian Novatek managers in spite of which the LNG supply from this company in Europe is increasing[8].
- REPowerEU plan should be followed by an European plan to limit reliance on Russians in nuclear fuel supply chain. First signals of such approach could already be seen in The Net-Zero Industry Act devoted to development of green technologies for the sake of European industry revival[9]. Further strenghtening of trans-Atlantic cooperation with companies like Cameco or Westinghouse in this sphere is crucial, increasing the capacity hand in hand with French Orano.
Creating binding goals of decreasing reliance on Russians in nuclear fuel supply chain in European Union, maybe including it inside a follow-up to REPowerEU declaration, as with other resources import decrease goals: natural gas, oil, coal. In spite of the fact that such goal would not be as effective as total embargo, like it is when it comes to Russian coal, it might be a long-lasting, and structural change that is predictable also in the light of economic signal for European industry needed for nuclear investment.
[1] https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukraine-and-Westinghouse-sign-agreement-for-Khmeln
[2] ESA Annual Report 2022, 13.10.23, p. 25, https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-10/ESA%20Annual%20Report%202022%20-%20Final%20%28website%29_2.pdf
[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A230%3AFIN&qid=1653033742483
[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-expects-eu-include-russias-rosatom-next-sanctions-2023-01-09/
[5] https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-just-cant-quit-russia-for-nuclear-power/
[6] https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/one-year-of-war-sanctions-impact-assessment-and-action-plan-for-2023/
[7] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-204-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[8] https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/novatek-surpass-gazprom-eus-largest-russian-gas-supplier-highlighting-continued-reliance-lng
[9] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en