

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE  
ODESA MECHNIKOV NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

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*INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES*

# STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE

Edited by I. Koval, O. Brusylovska, and V. Dubovyk



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2017

**Koval, Igor, Brusylowska, Olga, and Dubovyk, Volodymyr** (eds.),  
Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (Odesa: Odesa Mechnikov  
National University Press, 2017. – 262 p.).

Odesa Mechnikov National University Press is a department of the Odesa Mechnikov  
National University.

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Published in Ukraine by Odesa Mechnikov National University Press  
Elisavetynska, 12, Odesa, 65082.

Published with support by Fulbright Ukraine

Proofread by Amber Nickell and Elizabeth Rezun

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ISBN 978-617-689-239-7 © Odesa Mechnikov National University Press 2017

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## *CHAPTER 2*

# **STRATEGIC CULTURE OF UKRAINE AND ITS NON-NUCLEAR STATUS**

*Polina Sinovets*

Ukraine's refusal to maintain nuclear status not only clearly demonstrated the main features of Ukraine's strategic culture, but also signified a defining stage in its development. This was the first attempt of the Ukrainian state to challenge the will of the great powers, and it could help masculinize its strategic culture and it strengthens its self-reliance in security and foreign policy matters. However, in this case, characteristic features of Ukrainian strategic culture defined the scenario, which led to the signing of the Budapest memorandum and the further nuclear disarmament of Kyiv.

Ukraine proclaimed the non-nuclear course in 1990, but, in fact, it came to this in 1993. During the period from 1990 to 1993, Kyiv was often accused of pro-nuclear sentiments and ambitioning to become a transit nuclear state. Indeed, the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol by Verkhovna Rada, in 1992, occurred with the exception of Article 5, which envisaged Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. From 1993 to 1994, Ukraine resisted the demands of Russia and the US and refused the unconditional nuclear disarmament, making many experts suggest that Kyiv would draw the NPT regime into a severe crisis, which it would not be able to overcome. After, Ukraine's decision to give up nuclear weapons was the background for the other issues, such as the unlimited extension of the NPT at the conference in 1995, as well as the further situation of the arms control regime (most importantly, the future of START-I).

The period from 1992 to 1993 highlights some important features of the Ukrainian strategic culture. In this case, it must be noted that non-nuclear status was not an easy step for Ukraine; however, the struggle that took place during the mentioned years demonstrates the current Ukrainian decision's conformity.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine kept 220 strategic delivery vehicles (130 SS-19, 46 SS-24, 44 heavy bombers equipped with 1,068 long-range air-launched cruise missiles, and 1750 nuclear warheads assigned among them).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Ukraine possessed a strong civilian nuclear infrastructure, as well as the world's largest missile companies.

From the early stages of Ukrainian independence, there were two approaches concerning nuclear weapons among Ukrainian political elites. The first approach was formed during the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine in 1990, when the main aim was to prompt a civilized

“break up” with Russia. This “break up” would not be possible if Ukraine stayed nuclear; therefore, the idea to give up nuclear weapons was based on this intention. In addition, the so-called “Chernobyl syndrome”, meaning the widespread fear among the Ukrainian population of the nuclear technologies (including nuclear weapons), played a significant role. All these factors influenced Ukrainians relatively low support of nuclear status in the beginning of the 1990s (about 33%).<sup>2</sup>

A second approach to nuclear weapons was formed later, after Ukraine has already become an independent state. The main idea was formulated by Yuri Kostenko, the leader of the “hawks” parliamentary group, in his article “Nuclear Weapons: Good or Evil?” In it, he supported the idea of designating nuclear weapons as the property of the Ukrainian state. The nuclear disarmament should be performed gradually, considering the primary demands of Ukraine, in particular, financial compensation and security guarantees.<sup>3</sup> In April of 1993, 162 deputies of the Verkhovna Rada signed a letter “in support of the Ukrainian nuclear status”; this letter proclaimed Ukraine a successor of the USSR and “a transit nuclear state”.<sup>4</sup>

On June 3, 1993, in his speech at the Verkhovna Rada’s closed session on the ratification of START-1, the Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, emphasized that for Ukraine “the only real and stable perspective could be found in the doctrine of guaranteed deterrence and not by provoking defence”.<sup>5</sup> According to the Prime Minister, the basis for this deterrence could become the preservation of 42 national ICBMs, which had to be destroyed as an element of START-1 implementation.

Besides, Kuchma not only spoke about ideas of conventional deterrence, but he also added that Ukraine was the owner of nuclear weapons; at least for a certain period it should be proclaimed as a nuclear state.<sup>6</sup>

Russia and the US often interpreted these Ukrainian demands as the state’s attempt to delay the process of disarmament and, as the result, to become a real nuclear state. Even after the Ukrainian President signed the Trilateral Agreements with the leaders of Russia and the United States, the deputy director of the US and Canada Institute, Serhiy Rogov, noted that he “knows no example of when a state publicly claimed its nuclear status and then gave up nuclear weapons”. Rogov also insisted that Ukraine, as well as Russia, could not be trusted because “the current political culture in both countries does not include the notion of compliance”.<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, since declaring its intention to become a non-nuclear state, Ukraine has fulfilled its promise. The reasons for its initial denial to disarm as well as its final disarmament can be found in features of the state’s strategic culture. From the very beginning, Ukraine’s unpreparedness to accept



the compelled decision concerning the withdrawal of its nuclear arsenal to the territory of Russia (as Belarus and Kazakhstan did), demonstrated some of these features. For instance, it is worthwhile mentioning that Ukraine has declared itself equal to Russia as the official successor of the Soviet Union. In the winter of 1992, when President Yeltsin publicly announced his Presidential Nuclear Initiative, which aimed for the unilateral reduction of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and the retargeting of the Ukrainian ICBMs without any consultations with Ukraine, President Kravchuk unilaterally stopped providing Russia with tactical warheads.<sup>8</sup> Also in April of 1992, the Verkhovna Rada issued a decree to establish administrative control over all tactical nuclear weapons, confirming its right to possess these weapons.

Thus, Ukraine demanded equality from Russia at the same time when Russian officials publicly called Ukrainian independence “temporary”, implying, that European governments should not hurry to open embassies in Kyiv.<sup>9</sup>

Strobe Talbott, the head of the US delegation on the negotiations over Ukrainian nuclear disarmament in 1993, mentioned that the Russian Ambassador to the US, Volodymyr Lukin, compared the relationship between Russia and Ukraine with the relationship between New York and New Jersey. While the deputy of the Russian defence minister, Georgy Mamedov, often reminded Americans, that “everything between us and Ukrainians is a family business”, implying that Moscow would not tolerate the interference of Washington “into the family” for too long.<sup>10</sup> This apparent disregard of Ukrainian independence took place at the same time that Moscow declared its claims to Crimea, as well as disputed Ukrainian rights to the Black Sea Fleet.

It must be mentioned, that in resisting Russian pressure, Ukraine still did not regard Russia as a potential threat to Ukrainian national security. “Ukraine and Russia were living together for 350 years, so they have never applied weapons against each other, and will never do”, said President Kravchuk in his interview with an Italian newspaper in 1994.<sup>11</sup> This expression complies with the idea of experts in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, which they declared in the mid-2000s: “Not then, not now, we do not consider that a military threat from Russia is real, that it is necessary to have such a radical instrument as nuclear weapons for its deterrence”.<sup>12</sup>

Ukraine’s perception that Russia posed a low degree of threat in their relationship significantly reduced Ukrainian political elites’ motivation to retain nuclear weapons as a mechanism of deterrence. The primary motivation for resisting nuclear disarmament was the understanding of the great role that nuclear weapons played in politics, along with Ukraine’s wish to prove its equality with Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union.



During that time, the United States fully supported Russia, which created the impression that the importance of Ukraine was measured only by the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. In this situation, Ukraine considered the nuclear weapons as the only tool that could influence the situation.

There is a wide spread question as to the motivation of Ukraine. In particular, if it was going to disarm, why it had been resisting nuclear disarmament for two years? In this situation, we must consider the importance of understanding of Ukrainian strategic culture.

One of the main features of Ukrainian strategic culture is the absence of clearly defined aims providing for the state's national interests. From the very beginning, there was no clear understanding as to how Ukraine would be able to use its nuclear potential practically. For instance, Yuriy Kostenko, as one of the strongest opponents of disarmament noticed: "...due to its specifics, nuclear weapon performs defensive functions even if it is not controlled by the state where it is deployed. Therefore, the liquidation of nuclear weapons without an adequate substitute by the other instruments of deterrence will result in the loss of effective national security elements as well as threaten the existence of the Ukrainian state".<sup>13</sup> Kostenko's concept looked strange for any nuclear-weapon state. Having such a weapon and not controlling it is a rather dubious bonus in terms of security. Because any delay in Ukraine's nuclear disarmament could cause Russian aggression (for instance, violent disarmament operations)<sup>14</sup> or the total economic and diplomatic isolation of Kyiv by the US. Accordingly, Kostenko's sincerity should be questioned, due to the absence of intentions to develop nuclear deterrence, or nuclear weapons had a different function for Kyiv. The third variant is the absence of strategic understanding, which was already mentioned. This means that the main concept was to leave nuclear weapons in Ukraine and find out what kind of deal could be made later.

Firstly, let us consider the variant, in which nuclear deterrence offered a potential chance for Ukraine to develop its "hard security" sector; that is one of the distinctive features of masculine political culture. It is known that in April of 1992, in a general meeting devoted to blocking Ukraine's ability to launch of missiles from its territory, they realized that without the permission of Moscow, Kyiv's intervention in the command and control system for nuclear weapons management was impossible.<sup>15</sup> Thus, they were not working to create their own nuclear deterrence. However, it is known that at the same time the Centre for Operational and Strategic Studies was opened on the Ukrainian territory. This Centre was studying the possibilities of mastering nuclear weapons. Additionally, in February of 1992, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of Russia was stopped; this fact meant



that on the level of Ukrainian political elites, Ukraine at least investigated the prospects of nuclear deterrence. Ideologically, this idea never had wide political or expert popularity; little public popularity. In particular, the only deputy advocating for the concept of nuclear deterrence in Ukraine was a member of the Committee on Security and defence, Major-General Volodymyr Tolubko. He claimed that the path of nuclear deterrence was less expensive than the development of conventional deterrence. In particular, Tolubko referred to Soviet statistics, according to which Moscow was spending only 5-6% of its military budget on nuclear weapons.<sup>16</sup> In terms of strategic culture, an interesting feature of Tolubko's position was the fact that he saw nuclear deterrence for Ukraine in tandem with Russia. In other words, he offered to create a common strategic space under the command of Moscow. Ukraine was supposed to have a sort of "autonomy" within this space, such as administrative control over weapons, Ukrainian citizens' service in the strategic nuclear forces, and the application of nuclear weapons under the control of both the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents. Tolubko's main concern was a threat from the USA, which could do to Ukraine the same thing that it had "with Grenada, Yugoslavia and Iraq".<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, the deployment of Russian strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine would oblige Russia to defend Ukraine since "46 of 176 Ukrainian missiles are already equal to the capacity of the half US' land based ballistic missiles".<sup>18</sup> Tolubko suggested that Ukraine should not join the NPT; it should ratify the Lisbon treaty to START-1, but without the sections which obliged Ukraine to withdraw its nuclear weapons over a certain period. In addition, he considered an alternative, in which Ukraine would not ratify START-1 at all and only limit itself in its bilateral agreements with Russia, which was "the most credible and the best partner for creating an agreement concerning nuclear weapons".<sup>19</sup> The constructive idea meant that Ukraine would be able to accurately create its own deterrence or an independent nuclear industry using its partnership with Russia.<sup>20</sup> Tolubko's pro-nuclear position even included the idea that Ukraine should have a strong partner, which would defend its military independence. Moreover, this partner was traditionally associated with Moscow, which also proves the aforementioned statement that Russia was not considered as an enemy.

It is interesting that in the Verkhovna Rada, despite the lack of open ideological support for the ideas of Tolubko, there was still interest in nuclear deterrence. There was a famous episode, when the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy distributed copies of American experts' articles, written by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Miller, in the Verkhovna Rada. In these articles, the authors discussed the expediency and possibility of nuclear deterrence



in Ukraine. John Mearsheimer insisted that Ukraine should retain nuclear weapons, since it “cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee”.<sup>21</sup> At the same time, Miller spoke about the perniciousness of nuclear weapons for the world’s security and the disastrous consequences, if Ukraine retained nuclear weapons on its territory.<sup>22</sup> So, after the distribution of an equal number of both articles to the Council, the parliament requested 70 more copies of Mearsheimer’s article and no copy of Miller’s article the next day.<sup>23</sup>

A symbolic gesture that confirmed these pro-nuclear approaches was the partial ratification of the Lisbon protocol in November 1993. Instead of joining START as a non-nuclear state, Ukraine agreed to reduce 42% of the nuclear warheads that were deployed on its territory and 36% of its launch vehicles, as it was obliged by START. It was officially proclaimed that “Ukraine does not consider it necessary to execute Article V of the Lisbon Protocol”.<sup>24</sup>

Often, Americans cautiously considered Ukraine’s resistance to the immediate disarmament, while Russians suspected Kyiv in serious nuclear ambitions. In addition, Mykolay Sokolov, who was working at the arms control department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia during this period, assessed Ukraine’s primal position as a “feasible” to consider the possibility of developing its own nuclear deterrence.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, there was some other evidence, in addition to those which were already mentioned, that Ukraine was interested in nuclear weapons which it could control by itself.

The process of withdrawing tactical nuclear warheads to Russia was ceased, and Ukraine took administrative control of its nuclear weapons. These weapons were considered to be the most dangerous, as there was no central mechanism for blocking them; therefore, even field commanders could potentially control them. And, of course, it could be controlled by the state, if it had the least organizational capabilities available. In reality, the practice demonstrated that there were no such opportunities in Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s. This can be proved by the fact that the transfer of TNWs, performed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and the loyal officers at the bases, was resumed in April 1992 as a result of direct orders from Moscow. As the result, President Kravchuk was unpleasantly surprised during his June 1992 official visit to Washington, when he was informed that all tactical nuclear weapons were successfully withdrawn to the territory of Russia. He was surprised, because he did not even have any information about the fact that the TNWs withdrawal had recommenced. “I was trying to control the situation, but I haven’t succeed”, Kravchuk commented, referring to the fact that the military forces of CIS had more control over nuclear weapons based in



Ukraine, than Ukraine did.<sup>26</sup> According to the Alma-Ata Declaration, CIS was granted the right to control nuclear weapons belonging to its member-states. It turned out that the oath of allegiance did not change the situation in the Ukrainian Army significantly.

However, some other ideas existed. In his recent interview, President Kravchuk said: "If I could produce nuclear weapons, I would be able to withstand the pressure of Russia and the United States".<sup>27</sup> Kravchuk was also going to use the support of a partner state to fulfil this idea; this time it was going to be the United States. The idea was to dismantle nuclear weapons located in Ukraine instead of transferring them to Russia. The Ukrainian President offered its American partners the opportunity to build the necessary industry on the Ukrainian territory, where it would be possible to dismantle nuclear warheads from three countries. In addition to the significant costs which would be invested into this industry, the ability to dismantle such weapons would provide Kyiv with the appropriate information, knowledge and experience on how to produce them. Americans understood this situation very well and they were not going to let it happen.<sup>28</sup>

Ukraine had lost its illusions of the creating it's a nuclear deterrence in 1992, but in 1993 the Verkhovna Rada was still voting for Ukraine's recognition as a nuclear state. It seems that at that time Kostenko's approach began to dominate in Kyiv; this approach meant that Ukraine had nuclear weapons, but it did not have nuclear deterrence.

The main problem at that time was the lack of a clear strategy concerning the role of nuclear weapons in Ukrainian policy. A feature of Ukrainian strategic culture, which clearly describes Ukrainian nuclear policy, was defined by Kostomarov as "the absence of a clear goal, the impetuosity of movement, striving for the creation, and at the same time the decay of that not yet created".<sup>29</sup> By the way, the positions of the experts and political elites were not so different. In particular, the experts of the National Institute for Strategic Studies recommended connecting the transition "to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine with preservation of its security and the radical reduction of strategic weapons to the minimal level which could provide nuclear deterrence".<sup>30</sup> In fact, both claims are mutually exclusive. If Ukraine was going to become a non-nuclear state, why does it care about a minimal level of nuclear deterrence? Thus, further negotiations were conducted without a clearly defined final goal.

Later, when it was clear that Ukraine could not retain nuclear weapons, the nuclear arsenal turned into a bargaining chip in Kyiv's big game. As a tool for the possible development hard power (which is a feature of masculine policy), under the pressure of circumstances and the international community,



Ukraine turned nuclear weapons into an tool for gaining certain political and economic profits for itself. Many issues were at stake, such as the recognition of Crimea as a part of Ukraine by Russia, further delimitation of the borders, and Kyiv's debts to Moscow. In these situations, nuclear weapons could be used as a bargaining chip in relations with Russia. The openness of Ukrainian strategic culture played a significant role during the process of disarmament; in particular, it concerned Kyiv's desire to integrate into the community of democratic countries. Specifically, Borys Tarasyuk, who played a significant role in the negotiations for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, noticed that "the disarmament provided Ukraine with a kind of passport to the international community of the civilized nations".<sup>31</sup> The openness and maybe the incapacity for self-sufficient economic and even political development, along with the security guarantees, supported the introduction and the further domination of traditional features of Ukrainian strategic culture.

This approach showed the gradual development and approval of feminine Ukrainian policy. The failure to gain control over nuclear weapons pushed Ukraine to more peculiar diplomatic games and concessions.

The last step was the best, given the circumstances. Moreover, it was absolutely natural for Ukraine, which did not clearly understand the definition of hard power; the situation worsened after the signing of the Budapest memorandum on security assurances.

Nowadays it seems that the promised security assurances, which were given by the great powers, created an illusion of protection in Ukraine.

In fact, the Budapest memorandum stalled any reliance on hard power in Ukraine. It seems like the loss of such important element of hard power, nuclear weapons, has pushed Ukrainian political elites into a paradoxical neglect of conventional deterrence and army development.

The events of recent years present a different picture of hard power in the framework of Ukrainian policy. Regarding this factor through the prism of nuclear weapons discourse, there is currently an intensification of discussions about it on both political and social levels.

In 2014, the number of the bills was introduced to the Verkhovna Rada. In particular, in March of 2014, the deputies of the popular parliamentary parties "Batkivshchyna" and "Udar" initiated a bill "On denunciation the NPT of 1 July 1968 by Ukraine". On July 23, 2014, the deputies of "Svoboda" registered the bill "On the restoration of the nuclear status of Ukraine". The Verkhovna Rada did not vote on either of these bills; therefore, the question of the withdrawal of Ukraine from the NPT, as well as the restoration of its nuclear status, remain open and may turn into serious political discussion in the case that the security situation is aggravated.<sup>32</sup>



If we look at the prospect of such an opportunity, the voting would be ambiguous anyway. In particular, of all the political parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada, only three of them (“the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko”, “Svoboda” and “Pravyi Sector”) officially support the restoration of Ukraine’s nuclear status. Despite the fact that they did not gain more than 15% [of the vote] at the last parliamentary elections; we should not forget that moderate parties, such as “Batkivshchyna” and “Udar,” supported the idea of Ukraine’s withdrawal from the NPT. Therefore, any general voting could become crucial for Ukraine remaining within the framework of the NPT.<sup>33</sup>

The opinion polls confirm the growth of similar sentiments in the country. At the end of 2014, according to the Razumkov Centre, 49.3% of respondents were sure that it was necessary to restore the country’s nuclear status, at the same time 27.7% of respondents were against this idea. The interesting fact is that pro-nuclear sentiments dominate in Western and central parts of the country (64.3% and 60.3%), a bit less in the South (39.5%), while only the Eastern parts of Ukraine show a rather negative attitude to the nuclear choice (36.8% for the nuclear choice and 39.5% against).<sup>34</sup> Therefore, according to public opinion, the percentage of those who currently support Ukraine’s nuclear option has doubled compared to the beginning of the 1990s, when almost 33% of citizens supported this choice.

An interesting evolution was shown in the so-called “Chernobyl syndrome”, which was considered by the West as one of the most important reasons for Ukraine to give up nuclear weapons. In particular, in 2005, 13.5% of Ukrainians were worried about Chernobyl as an issue; in 2008 this amount decreased to 7.8%. In 2014, the opinion polls confirmed that the Chernobyl disaster was in last place (only 10%) compared to the fear of an invasion (62%) or growing prices (68%).<sup>35</sup>

These figures suggest a certain evolution of the pain threshold within Ukrainian strategic culture, which has been under the influence of obvious challenges to Ukrainian security, like the Russian threat. Thus, resulting from the Maidan and its consequences, such as the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the beginning of the war in the Donbas, the number of Ukrainians, who perceived Russia as a threat increased to 73%.<sup>36</sup>

It also gives the impression that those events have generally increased the role of “hard power” in Ukrainians’ consciousness and in Ukrainian policy.

At the same time, the traditional feminine approach can also be located in the strategic and cultural worldview of Ukrainians, especially when comparing the statistical numbers. For instance, among Ukrainians who support Ukraine’s nuclear choice today, only 4% believe that this decision is possible.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, these social sentiments reflect Ukrainians’ perception that



their country is not an independent player in international politics. A comparison of the Euro-Atlantic integration's popularity ratings' statistics: from 15% in 2012, to 64% in 2014, and to 78% in 2016, gives a clearer demonstration of traditional Ukrainian strategic and cultural stereotypes.<sup>38</sup>

**Conclusions.** In the early 1990's, Ukraine received some impetus for the transformation of its strategic culture. Nuclear weapons, as the most powerful symbol of hard power in politics, could give the Ukrainian strategic culture some incentive to masculinize. However, key features of the existing strategic culture of Ukraine played a role in this. In particular, the considerable pressure from Russia and the United States, along with Ukraine's lack of confidence in defending its own interests at any cost, even at a high price, prompted Kyiv to continue the traditional path of development. The permanent search for a strategic partner as an instrument for the protection of Ukrainian statehood was also a hallmark of the process of disarmament. On one hand, attempts to retreat from international requirements and to launch their own nuclear program or to preserve nuclear forces have always been considered by Ukraine in tandem with another great power. Both alternatives - the United States or Russia - were considered as partners who could financially support or defend Kyiv, [albeit] by different forces of the Ukrainian political system. On the other hand, the result for Ukraine, namely the Budapest memorandum, became the quintessence of a policy of finding a strong partner - in the form of both states guaranteeing Ukraine's security.

Diplomacy as a means of developing national security (instead of adequate military-containment policies) along with Ukrainians' openness, contributed the success of US and Russian policies; political pressure coupled with the promise of Ukraine's integration into the community of democratic states were key factors in the nuclear disarmament in Ukraine.

Kyiv did not have any conscious motivations to keep nuclear weapons. On one hand, the Russian threat in 2014 was significant enough to resist with weapons, especially nuclear weapons. On the other hand, neither political nor expert communities clearly understood the main challenges of the country's policy, which could be solved by nuclear weapons. At the strategic level, Ukrainians did not have a clear understanding of their own goals and interests, which were connected with nuclear weapons and worth some state's concessions. As a result, the two years of defending Ukraine's rights to nuclear weapons ended in defeat, this fact emphasized the "inconsistency of movement" and the lack of effort to complete something that had been started.

The above-mentioned features are now quite noticeable in Ukrainian politics. In this case, one cannot help but to agree with G. Perepelytsya, who notes a certain fetishization of diplomacy as a means of ensuring Ukrainian national



security and defence.<sup>39</sup> In modern Ukrainian politics, this tradition originates in the Budapest memorandum, but can also be located in later documents, such as the Military Doctrine of 2012, in which the main methods of preventing a military conflict were not military restraint, but a set of political and diplomatic measures. The text of the doctrine mentioned that, if Ukraine wanted to deter aggressors, it would appeal to the United Nations Security Council as well as to “the powerful guarantors of Ukrainian security ... according to the Budapest memorandum”.<sup>40</sup>

Our study does not argue that Ukraine should retain its nuclear potential, since it would greatly complicate not only its existence, but also its integration into the global community of democratic states. The main thesis is that Ukraine’s refusal of nuclear weapons best demonstrates some of the specific features inherent in the strategic culture of our state.

A particularly striking set of polls conducted by Ukrainian citizens in 2014-2016 underscores this example. They have a clear understanding of Russia as an enemy, and an understanding of the need to develop the state’s “hard power”. Some Ukrainians are nostalgic for nuclear weapons; however, an absolute majority does not believe in Ukraine’s capacity to strengthen its security independently. Traditionally, as a guarantee of security and the state’s independence, most Ukrainians would rather consider joining a powerful military-political alliance such as NATO.

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<sup>1</sup> Marco De Andreis, Fransisco Calogero, “The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy” (SIPRI Research Report. – N 10, Oxford University Press, 1995), 23.

<sup>2</sup> Christopher Stevens, “Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarmament. The Case of Ukraine”, *Nonproliferation Review*, 2008 (15) 1:54.

<sup>3</sup> Юрій Костенко, «Історія ядерного роззброєння України» (Київ: Ярославів Вал, 2015), 98.

<sup>4</sup> De Andreis, Calogero, “The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy”, 27.

<sup>5</sup> Костенко, Історія, 263.

<sup>6</sup> Костенко, Історія, 264.

<sup>7</sup> Trip Report: CISAC Delegation Plutonium in Moscow, March 14-18, 1994 (Nuclear Control Institute Collection, FSU-8/94-10/94. – Folder 111, US National Security Archives), 10.

<sup>8</sup> Defense Intelligence Report ODB 27029, 119-120.

<sup>9</sup> Long, Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs and Nuclear Policies”, 33.

<sup>10</sup> Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, 80.

<sup>11</sup> Kravchuk: Nonproliferation Treaty to be Signed as Soon as Possible. *La Republica* – 29 June 1994.

<sup>12</sup> C. Stevens, “Identity Politics and Nuclear Disarmament. The Case of Ukraine”, *Nonproliferation Review*, 2008 (15) 1:54.

<sup>13</sup> Костенко, Історія, 260.

<sup>14</sup> Dynamics of Change in Eurasia, no 29, DI-26870-348C, 92 (N) (Nunn-Lugar Revisited).

A Conference at the Musgrove Conference Center St. Simons Island, Georgia, 26029 September 2013), 128.

<sup>15</sup> Костенко, Історія, 64-65.

<sup>16</sup> Владимир Толубко, «Ядерное оружие, космос и флот: решение вопросов не терпит промедления» (Предложения для Верховной Рады Украины/ Архив министерства иностранных дел Украины, Фонд 1, дело 7058), 102.

<sup>17</sup> Толубко, 101.

<sup>18</sup> Толубко, 101.

<sup>19</sup> Толубко, 103.

<sup>20</sup> Толубко, 103.

<sup>21</sup> John Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent", *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (1993): 50.

<sup>22</sup> Steven Milller, "The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent" *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993): 73.

<sup>23</sup> Trip Report. (Discussions of CISAC Plutonium Study. Kiev, Ukraine – May 30 – June 3, 1994 US National Security Archives, Folder 111), 16.

<sup>24</sup> Постанова Верховної Ради України Є Про ратифікацію Договору між Союзом Радянських Соціалістичних Республік і Сполученими Штатами Америки про скорочення і обмеження стратегічних наступальних озброєнь, підписаного у Москві 31 липня 1991 року і Протоколу до нього, підписаного у Лісабоні від імені України 23 травня 1992 року (Костенко Ю.І. Історія ядерного роззброєння України), 444.

<sup>25</sup> Nikolai Sokov, interview to the author, given April 15, 2016.

<sup>26</sup> Leonid Kravchuk, interview given to the author, April 1st, 2016.

<sup>27</sup> Leonid Kravchuk.

<sup>28</sup> Defense Intelligence Report ODB 27092, 124.

<sup>29</sup> Николай Костомаров, "Две русские народности", в Собрание сочинений Н. И. Костомарова в 8 книгах, accessed December 19, 2016, [http://dugward.ru/library/kostomarov/kostomarov\\_dve\\_russkie\\_narodnosti.html](http://dugward.ru/library/kostomarov/kostomarov_dve_russkie_narodnosti.html)

<sup>30</sup> «К вопросу о размещении на территории Украины ядерного оружия» (Аналитическая справка, Филиал Национального института стратегических исследований, конструкторское бюро «Южное», 1992), С.35.

<sup>31</sup> Long, Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs and Nuclear Policies", 57.

<sup>32</sup> Nuclear non-proliferation (Ukrainian Prism. Foreign Policy 2015), 134.

<sup>33</sup> Nuclear non-proliferation, 135.

<sup>34</sup> Ставлення громадян до вступу в НАТО і інших питань безпеки. Фонд Демократичні ініціативи імені Ілька Куричіва – Accessed December 2016, <http://dif.org.ua/ua/publications/press-relizy/stavlennja-gromadjan-do-vstupu-v-nato-i-inshih-pitan-bezpeki.htm>

<sup>35</sup> Ядерна енергетика в світі та в Україні: стан та перспективи розвитку. Аналітична доповідь Центру Розумкова. Національна безпека і оборона, 3 (2008):10.

<sup>36</sup> Лише 2% українців продовжують вважати відносини з РФ дружніми, 73% бачать загрозу для своєї країни. Accessed 6 July 2014, <http://news.finance.ua/ua/news>

<sup>37</sup> Референдум щодо вступу у НАТО був би виграний, проте це питання ділить Україну, 29 листопада, 2015 Фонд Демократичні ініціативи імені Ілька Куричіва. Accessed 15 November 2016, <http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/publications/press-relizy/referenit-ukrainu-.htm>



<sup>38</sup> Опитування: за вступ у НАТО на референдумі проголосували б 78% українців, Радіо Свобода, accessed 6 July, 2016, <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/27841417.html>

<sup>39</sup> Grigory Perepelitsa, the Round Table “The 20th anniversary of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine”, Odessa April 25, 2016.

<sup>40</sup> “Указ Президента України № 390/2012 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 8 червня 2012 року «Про нову редакцію Воєнної доктрини України»”, accessed 10 September 2016, <http://armyua.com.ua/voyenna-doktrina-ukraini/>